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Although male-perpetrated intimate partner violence against women 
(IPVAW) is a global epidemic, research has suggested that Russian 
women are at a heightened risk of IPVAW compared to women in the 
West (Gondolf & Shestakov, 1997; Horne, 1999). The international 
battered women’s movement has constructed issues of IPVAW as a 
public concern, highlighting the ways in which macro-level social 
structures and ideologies contribute to gender-based violence at the 
micro-level and influence community-based violence prevention and 
intervention efforts. The purpose of this paper is to theorize the potential 
impact of one such institution, the Russian Orthodox Church, in shaping 
Russian women’s experiences of IPVAW. Implications for the 
development of services to address IPVAW within the Russian Orthodox 
community are examined. 
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Violence against women is an international epidemic. While violence 
against women in the global context encompasses a variety of acts, 
including battering, sexual assault, systematic rape as a weapon of war, 
female genital mutilation, forced prostitution, and sexual harassment, 
women around the world are most at risk of violence perpetrated by men 
they know, family members, and male intimate partners. Composite 
findings from every country in which large scale prevalence studies have 
been undertaken suggest that between 10% and 50% of women have been 
physically or sexually assaulted by an intimate partner at some point in 
their lives (World Health Organization, 2002). This suggests that male-
perpetrated intimate partner violence against women (IPVAW) is a global 
public health concern.  
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 In the Russian context, valid prevalence estimates of IPVAW have 
been historically difficult to obtain due to data suppression under the 
communist regime (Cubbins & Vannoy, 2005; Gondolf & Shestakov, 
1997; Horne, 1999); however, emerging evidence suggests that IPVAW 
is a grave concern among Russian women. Data from the Moscow Health 
Survey, a large scale study of 1,190 individuals in Moscow, revealed that 
over one half (52.9%) of Russian women believed that intimate partner 
violence in Russia was a “serious problem” and that almost one in five 
men (18.6%) believed that violence against women was justified if a 
woman was found to be unfaithful to her partner (Stickley, Kislitsyna, 
Timofeeva, & Vagero, 2008).  Further, it has been reported that women in 
Russia are four to five times more likely to experience intimate partner 
violence than women in the West (Horne, 1999) and that women in 
Russia are two and a half times more likely to be murdered at the hands 
of an intimate partner than women in the United States (Gondolf & 
Shestakov, 1997). This body of research suggests that, compared to 
women in the West, Russian women face a heightened vulnerability for 
IPVAW. 
 The international battered women’s movement has been pivotal in 
constructing issues of male-perpetrated IPVAW as a public concern, 
highlighting the ways in which macro-level gender inequalities contribute 
to the use of male violence against women at the micro-level. To 
understand the epidemic of IPVAW in Russia it is therefore necessary to 
examine the impact of social institutions on creating the conditions which 
contribute to IPVAW for Russian women, shape the meanings that 
women ascribe to violence in their lives, and influence the range of 
options available to survivors. The purpose of this theoretical paper is to 
examine the potential impact of one such institution, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, in shaping women’s experiences of IPVAW.  
Implications for the development of feminist services to address IPVAW 
within the Russian Orthodox community will be explored. 
 
Intersectionality and IPV against Russian Orthodox Women 
 
Although numerous feminist theories have implications for understanding 
male-perpetrated IPVAW, two bodies of feminist work have historically 
dominated the discourse of the battered women’s movement. Radical 
feminist theories, that contend that patriarchy both causes and reinforces 
men’s use of violence as a means of maintaining gender hierarchy, have 
sought to universalize women’s experiences of male-perpetrated violence 
by highlighting the common vulnerability that all women face for such 
violence because of their gender. Liberal feminist theories, with an 
emphasis on the role of the state in not only tolerating but perpetuating 
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IPVAW through inadequate legal protections for survivors, have focused 
on increasing the criminal accountability of perpetrators and reducing the 
legal, social, and economic barriers that may keep women trapped in 
abusive relationships. While both radical and liberal feminist approaches 
have been fundamental in framing the public discourse on IPVAW as a 
social justice issue and drawing much needed attention to the 
victimization of women and girls, these approaches have increasingly 
been criticized for promoting a homogenized account of IPVAW that 
ignores important variations in women’s experiences. In particular, post-
colonial feminists, feminists from racialized communities, lesbian 
feminists, and anti-poverty activists have rejected the radical feminist 
notion of a “shared womanhood” approach to violence against women, 
highlighting the increased and differential vulnerability of women in 
socially, racially, and economically marginalized communities for 
violence based on their unique social positioning (see Sokoloff & Pratt, 
2005). Further, the criminalization approach to IPVAW espoused by 
liberal feminists has been criticized as reflecting the priorities of white, 
economically privileged, heterosexual women in the West and ignoring 
the differing relationships of marginalized women with the state and the 
prison industrial complex (INCITE-Critical Resistance, 2005). For these 
reasons, feminist scholars have begun to call for the application and 
development of feminist intersectional theories specific to IPVAW 
(Bograd, 2005; Damant et al, 2008; Josephson, 2005).   
 Feminist intersectional frameworks have rejected the 
essentializing of women’s experiences by highlighting the diversity 
among women based on their intersecting identities as members of 
multiply oppressed (and privileged) social categories (Yuval-Davis, 
2006). Importantly, however, it has been argued that these frameworks 
have prioritized issues of gender, race, class, and sexual orientation as the 
primary organizing aspects of women’s lives, often minimizing or 
discounting the confounding complexities of an array of women’s other 
social identities and categorical memberships (Ludvig, 2006). In the 
IPVAW literature, recent decades have seen an increased visibility of the 
experiences of women of colour, lesbian women, differently-abled 
women, and poor women in shaping feminist discourses of violence and 
victimization from an intersectional framework. A consideration of 
women’s experiences as members of faith communities and the 
implications of this membership on women’s experiences of IPVAW has 
remained under-developed. When issues of religion and spirituality have 
been considered in the feminist literature on IPVAW, such accounts are 
often provided by women of Christian or Jewish faith in the North 
American context. The application of feminist theories to the experiences 
of women of the Russian Orthodox faith residing in post-communist 
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Russia, therefore, provides an important and necessary contribution to the 
literature. 
 
IPVAW and Faith Communities 
 
While issues of religion and spirituality have historically been neglected 
in the feminist literature on IPVAW, recent empirical work has suggested 
that an understanding of the role of religion in the lives of women is 
important to the development of effective violence intervention services 
for women in faith-based communities. Research on the experiences of 
battered women has highlighted that religious and spiritual beliefs can 
serve as either a positive force or as a barrier for women in violent 
relationships. While some women report that their faith provided them 
with the strength to survive the violence and the motivation to terminate a 
violent relationship, other women reported that their religious beliefs 
were a source of great conflict to them as they attempted to ascribe 
meaning to their experiences and struggled to take active steps to protect 
themselves from violence (Pyles, 2007; Wendt, 2008). Certain 
interpretations of beliefs regarding the sanctity of marriage, the divine 
authority of men over the family, and the acceptance of suffering and 
endurance as necessary in individual lives, as an emulation of suffering of 
Christ, have been cited as common deterrents prohibiting women from 
actively questioning or challenging the inappropriateness of the use of 
violence by their partners (Wendt, 2008). As such, women’s religious 
belief systems are an important determinant of their acceptance or 
rejection of the violence against them as well as their assessment of the 
range of options available to them to effectively cope with the aftermath 
of violence.  
 A consideration of the role of religious belief systems and the 
power of institutionalized religious doctrines to impact personal behavior 
is particularly salient in understanding women’s experiences of IPVAW. 
Historical conceptualizations of IPVAW have focused primarily on 
physical and sexual violence; however, recent decades have seen an 
increased emphasis on the psychological, emotional, and spiritual aspects 
of IPVAW. A recognition that intimate partner violence is not only an 
attack on a woman’s physical body but also her mind and spirit is central 
to a holistic understanding of violence against women. Spiritual abuse, 
which includes the misuse and abuse of religious doctrine as a means of 
maintaining male power and control in intimate relationships (including 
the use of religious doctrine as a justification for male violence), is 
increasingly being included by feminists and battered women’s advocates 
as part of the matrix of power and control tactics that define IPVAW (e.g. 
Ontario Women’s Directorate, 2006). As religious institutions are a 
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powerful force in shaping the individual ideologies, and behaviors, of 
their members, they provide a critical link in the eradication of IPVAW. 
Given the high rates of formal affiliation with the Russian Orthodox 
Church, with 79% of Russian women and 66% of Russian men 
identifying as followers of Russian Orthodoxy (Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center, 2008), understanding the ways in which Russian 
Orthodox doctrine may impact women’s experiences of violence in the 
home is crucial for the construction of effective violence prevention and 
intervention efforts for this population of women.   
 
The Image and Role of Women in the Russian Orthodox Church 
 
Religion has an essential effect on the development of any society by 
regulating religious norms and models of behavior for each person and 
for society as a whole. Religious doctrine serves as a basis for dominant 
ideologies, establishes priorities and values, predetermines gender roles, 
and influences the establishment of traditions, laws, and customs. 
Because religious teachings institutionalize a way of thinking and 
behaving for a people, they have direct relevance for understanding 
gender relations and, subsequently, IPVAW, at both the macro- and the 
micro-levels.  
The Russian Orthodox Church is one of 15 independent Eastern 
Orthodox Christian Churches in the world. Eastern Orthodox Christian 
Churches have become consolidated by their common dogmas, basic 
religious canons and main laws, and through established principal 
devotions. Apart from these commonalities, all Eastern Orthodox 
Churches have established different rules and practices to accommodate 
regional variations in social circumstances and living conditions. These 
factors have discretely affected the social and political directions of the 
churches. This is particularly evident in the history of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (Kucher, 2004).  After the Russian Revolution in 1917, 
the Russian Orthodox Church was criticized by the new government of 
the Bolsheviks as an opposition to the communist regime that 
propagandized in favour of atheism. After the collapse of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, the period of revival of the 
Russian Orthodox Church began. Currently, the Russian Orthodox 
Church functions as the dominant religion in Russia.  While there is an 
official separation of church and state, the Russian Orthodox Church is 
endorsed by the present government of Russia and receives support from 
it (Kaisch & Linzey, 1999). According to current public opinion polls, 
“Russians trust the Orthodox Church more than any other public 
institution, including law courts, trade unions, mass media, the military, 
the police, and the government” (Knox, 2005, p. 533).    
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      The Russian Orthodox Church has had a tremendous influence on 
the development of gender ideologies in Russian society. Russian 
Orthodox doctrine prescribes distinct roles for men and women within the 
context of the church, family, and society based on a rigid conservative 
interpretation of biblical passages such as "Wives should be subordinate 
to their husbands as to the Lord” (Eph. 5:22 New American Bible) and 
"But I want you to know that Christ is the head of every man, and a 
husband the head of his wife, and God the head of Christ" (I Cor.11: 3). 
These interpretations not only support patriarchal family and social 
structures, they simultaneously reinforce both the celebration and 
degradation of women. On the one hand, Orthodox Christianity dignifies 
women by its veneration of the Virgin Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ. 
All women are believed to embody the spirit of Mary and, as such, are to 
be exalted. On the other hand, women are believed to be powerful 
temptresses as evidenced through the story of Eve enticing Adam to eat 
from the Tree of Knowledge, precipitating their exile from the Garden of 
Eden (Engel, 2004; Ozhogova, 2005). As a result, there is a persistent 
suspicious and negative attitude towards women as symbols of original 
sin. The contradiction between woman as virgin mother and woman as 
sinful seductress forms the basis of a sexual double standard in church 
doctrine that justifies women’s subordination and relegation to the 
domestic sphere. 
 The teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church have “condemned 
women as sinful – wanton, deceitful, instigator of lust and pollution to 
encourage men to fear and distrust women and to control their sexuality 
in order to protect the family from dishonor and society from disorder” 
(Engel, 2004, p. 9). Orthodoxy emphasizes conservative attitudes towards 
women and supports gender segregation, resulting in women’s 
designation to a secondary position within the Church. By extension, 
women are assigned an inferior position within the family and society as 
man’s servant. As such, the main duty of a woman is obedience to her 
husband (Col. 3:18; I Cor. 11:3, 5, 7-10; Eph. 5:22-24; Eph. 5:33). Literal 
interpretation of the Biblical texts as a divine dictum that a wife must 
serve her husband and obey him unconditionally, used by Russian 
Orthodox clergy, creates an oppressive environment for women that is 
intensified by fixed duties in family life. The priest and Director of the 
Diocesan School of Orthodox catechesis and the church pedagogy of St. 
Sergius Radonezhskiy Anatoly Garmayev points out "The duty of the 
wife is to honor and respect her husband. … The next duty of the wife is 
to be submissive to her husband. After all, submissive to her husband - so, 
revering him” (Garmayev, 2008, ¶¶14, 20). Archimandrite Alipy Voronov 
(2003) emphasizes the central role of wives as the assistants of their 
husbands whose primary responsibility is to bring up children in the fear 
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of God. Only women who understand this divine mandate are good 
mothers and wives. Voronov (2003) also emphasizes that if the husband 
has weaknesses, for example alcoholism, the wife should forgive her 
husband for this weakness, “because she herself is not without 
weaknesses. Whatever the husband, but he is the head of the house, he - 
the owner” (Voronov, 2003, ¶11). Orthodox women should obey and 
resign to their husbands (Drozdov, 1996) and accept with thanks any 
conditions that God creates for a woman, as stated by the priest and the 
member of the Committee of religious social work Igor Fomin (Efanova, 
2008). Archpriest, the dean/presbyter of the Samarian Church of Sergija 
Radonezhskogo, Evgeniy Shestun emphasizes that the family exists only 
if a husband is the head of the family and the wife is afraid of him 
(Shestun, 2001). Thus, under Orthodoxy, fear, devotion, and obedience 
are prescribed in a hierarchal manner: a husband is afraid of God, a wife 
is afraid of her husband, and children respect and are afraid their parents.1 
In Orthodox families, this prescription is absolute. According to Shestun 
(2001), people do not choose these rules but are obliged to follow them. 
While not all men necessarily desire to be the head of the family nor do 
all women want to be restrained, they must commit to do so to please 
God. Women are expected not only to show deference and fear to their 
male partners to gain the Lord’s grace but are also expected to relinquish 
all decision-making authority to them as well. This dehumanization of 
women as objects for male control and possession is popularized in a 
common Russian proverb: “Chicken is not a bird, and the woman is not a 
human being.”  Voronov (2003) writes: “You women should not take 
offense to this because a woman is not whole, but part of the whole. The 
part cannot be paramount … The woman is a part, but not the head, the 
head of a husband” (Voronov, 2003, ¶9).  
In addition to designating clear social roles for men and women, 
the Russian Orthodox Church makes prescriptions for the sexual relations 
between them.  These beliefs play an important role in understanding both 
women’s subordinate position within the church and the proliferation of 
misogyny within the Russian Orthodox faith.  Indeed, some scholars have 
identified religious dictums regarding the sexual relations between men 
and women as “the most deep-seated cause of men’s negative attitudes 
toward women” (Holm, 1994, p. xiv). Although the church blesses sexual 
relations between husband and wife as essential for reproduction many of 
the most influential writings about sexuality within the Russian Orthodox 
faith were written by Church Fathers and Orthodox Monks who had 
                                                
1 In the canonical text of the Bible translated into Russian, the word 
“boyatsia” is used, which means “to be afraid of” (Eph. 5:33 Russian 
Biblical Society).   
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undertaken vows of celibacy, such as Jerome, Tertullian, Augustine, and 
Sylvester. It has been argued that these religious leaders projected their 
anxiety and fears about their own sexuality onto women in their spiritual 
writings and teaching, reinforcing not only a patriarchal but misogynistic 
view of female sexuality (Drure, 1994). As prominent church leaders, 
their attitudes about women and sexuality strongly influenced the 
Church’s position on questions about morality, resulting in the exaltation 
of ascetics and ascetic behavior. Because the main thing in marriage is 
spiritual unification but not sexual contact, sexual relations, even within 
marriage, were considered “dirty” and a sin, but also a necessary evil for 
procreation purposes (Drozdov, 1996; Moroz, 2006). Priests stress that 
spouses who live in high, pious marriages should have sex only to 
conceive a new life. If spouses decide not to have more children, they 
should continue to live as brother and sister, without sexual contact 
(Shestun, 2006).   
Sexual ideologies within the Russian Orthodox faith encompass 
not only a belief system that reinforces a fear of female sexuality (and, by 
extension, femaleness itself) but also behavioural proscriptions governing 
sexual contact between husband and wife, such as prohibition of sexual 
contact on Wednesdays, Fridays, Sundays, holidays, and during fasts 
(four times a year for 20-40 days) (Balashov, 2009; Gumerov, 2009; 
Korobkov, 2009; Reidman, 2009). It is further advised that couples 
abstain from sexual contact during the whole period of pregnancy 
(Korobkov, 2009; Moscow State University, 2007). Sex and sexual 
relations are linked to the female nature, and women’s biological nature is 
considered to be the foundation for women’s inferiority within the church 
and, by extension, society as a whole. Female sexuality, as Holm (1994) 
writes, “relates on the one hand to menstruation and child birth, and on 
the other hand to myths about women’s sexual nature” (p. xiv). Women’s 
nature, and particularly inherent uncleanliness, is used as justification for 
limiting women’s roles within the Church. Women are prohibited from 
attending church during their menstruation, and they have a 40-day 
confinement period after childbirth known as the ‘period of purification’ 
during which time it is taboo for them to enter the church (Holy 
Dormition Pskov-Caves Monastery, n.d.). As a consequence of this 
period of purification, women cannot attend the baptism of their own 
child that, in compliance with the tradition, should be before this 40-day 
period is completed. 
  Beliefs regarding women’s uncleanness within the Russian 
Orthodox Church were historically based on the Jewish tradition and the 
Scripture (Lev. 12:2-5). Later, however, during Christianization, some 
Jewish laws regarding women’s nature were altered, and these changes 
were affirmed by the decisions of Church Councils.  For example, the 
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limitation of women’s participation in church activities during 
menstruation was regulated by rules of the VI Ecumenical Council in 
Constantinople in 691-692 (Krotov, n.d.). Despite changes that dictated 
that the only restriction for women was that they were not allowed to take 
communion during this time, Orthodox Christian tradition not only 
continued with prohibitions for women but further extended and 
toughened the rules governing women’s access to the church during times 
of “uncleanliness.” There is a strong, prevalent opinion among Russian 
Orthodox believers that women are not allowed to even enter into 
churches during this period, nor are they permitted to touch icons and 
other sacred objects. Although these practices persist in Orthodox faith, it 
is important to note that these rules do not have any theological 
foundation but, rather, are based on secular prejudice (Lorgus, 2005).  
The failure to recognize women as equal human beings, with 
distinct identities separate from their husbands, has defined the Russian 
Orthodox Church from the beginning of its history and persists today. As 
a result, women’s experiences and knowledge have been commonly 
ignored within the Russian Orthodox faith. Women’s views are often 
characterized “as marginal, frightening, or dangerous, or as superstition 
rather than real religion” (Franzmann, 2000, p. 72). Women’s 
contributions to the establishment and improvement of the norms, laws, 
and principles of the Russian Orthodox faith have been minimal and have 
not had an essential influence on religious life. As such, women’s identity 
within the Russian Orthodox Church has been defined by a patriarchal 
religious doctrine which not only views them as subordinate to their male 
counterpart but devoid of free will, autonomy, and independence. The 
Church’s characterization of women as the servants of men not only 
influences the development of individual attitudes that support men’s use 
of violence against women but have also impacted the status of women in 
Russian society as a whole.  
 
Women’s Rights in Soviet Russia 
 
The historical relationships between women’s social status, Russian 
Orthodoxy, and secular law have been complex. After the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, the position of women in Russia, which was renamed 
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was substantially 
altered. Although women had been historically oppressed in Russian 
society, the liberty of women was an important part of the politics of the 
Soviet state.  The Bolsheviks sought to “transform traditional patterns of 
gender relations in order to consolidate its rule” (Ashwin, 2000, p. 1). 
During the next several years, the Bolsheviks passed several new laws 
that assured women the same civic rights and freedoms as men, 
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essentially equalizing gender relations under the law (All-Russia 
Congress of Soviets, 1918; Congress of Soviets of the USSR, 1936; 
Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, 1918). Women were 
allowed to choose their profession and education, place of employment, 
and residence, and were entitled to the same salary as men. Further, 
women received equal obligations and benefits in marriage and divorce 
for the first time in history. Nevertheless, the gender “equality” under the 
law did not manifest itself as “equality” in the domestic sphere. During 
the Soviet regime, women had a substantial and essential role in the 
labour force; however, they were commonly relegated into unskilled and 
low paying jobs because men often refused to do these jobs. At the same 
time, women continued to have obligations to do domestic duties: 
cooking, cleaning, laundry, and childcare. Soviet propaganda aimed to 
encourage women to see themselves first of all as mothers: “Motherhood, 
promoted as the highest expression of femininity, was defined not merely 
as the care of children but also as the physical and emotional support of 
men” (Bridger, 1996, p. 243). Thus, although women were “liberated” in 
theory under communism, the degree to which women’s experiences 
equaled those of men was minimal.    
As the power and autonomy of the church threatened Bolshevik 
rule, the new communist government instituted a policy of militant 
atheism (Marsh, 2005). During this period, there was a proliferation of 
anti-religious propaganda sanctioned by the government, and church 
property was commonly seized. As a result, the influence of the Russian 
Orthodox Church over the daily lives of individuals was greatly 
minimized during this period of government-imposed secularization. The 
repression of Russian Orthodoxy and its rigid ideologies regarding the 
proper role of women in society, coupled with new legal freedoms for 
women under communist rule, resulted in a complex and contradictory 
situation for women in Russia. Although they were technically equal to 
men under the law, hegemonic glorification of women’s primary role as 
wife and mother was largely untouched. Now, however, it was expected 
that women complete these roles while simultaneously participating with 
men in the public labor market. 
 
Gender in Contemporary Russian Family and Society 
 
The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and secular law, 
and its impact on women’s status in society, has changed significantly 
over the last twenty years. During the period of glasnost under Mikhail 
Gorbachev, religious suppression and persecution in Russia came to an 
end, ushering in a new period of religious revitalization (Marsh, 2005).  
In 1988, Gorbachev granted the Russian Orthodox Church status as a 
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“legitimate public institution,” a status that was solidified further in 1990 
as the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief which 
legalized the separation of church and state in Russia (Marsh, 2005). In 
conjunction with a period of intense nationalism following the collapse of 
the USSR and concerns regarding the new presence of western religions 
in Russia that were feared to threaten this nationalism, the Russian 
government passed a new law in 1997 that privileged Orthodoxy, Islam, 
Judaism, and Buddhism as the traditional religions of Russia and granted 
them special recognition and privileges under the law (Marsh, 2005; 
Walters, 2007). As a result, it has been argued that “the Russian Orthodox 
Church has resumed its place at the center of Russian culture” (Jarvik, 
2006, p. 166). 
 Although there is an official separation of church and state, the 
Russian government informally endorses the Russian Orthodox Church in 
the name of Russian nationalism. As noted by President Putin in 2005,  
 
One should not completely draw a line between the culture and 
the church.  Of course, by law in our country the church is 
separate from the state, but in the soul and history of our people 
it’s all together. It always has been and it always will be” (Putin as 
cited in Jarvik, 2006, p. 172).   
 
Putin echoed this message on the tenth anniversary of Patriarch Aleksii 
II’s election when he celebrated the Russian Orthodox Church’s 
“enormous role in the spiritual unification of the Russian land after many 
years of life without faith, moral degradation, and atheism” (Putin as cited 
in Knox, 2005, p. 542). Putin has also been vocal in publicly 
acknowledging the Russian Orthodox Church as “a key force in 
promoting social stability and moral unity around general moral priorities 
of justice, patriotism, good works, constructive labor, and family values” 
(Putin as cited in Knox 2005, p. 543). The power of the church is so great 
that even those in Russia who do not identify as Russian Orthodox 
commonly report high levels of trust in the church, with over one third 
(36.3%) of “nonreligious” Russians reporting that they believe that the 
Russian Orthodox church provides answers to people’s moral and 
spiritual problems (Marsh, 2005). 
 Although women currently have equality under secular law in 
Russia, the powerful influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose 
doctrine continues to support the inferiority of women, creates a social 
paradox for Russian women. While they are technically protected under 
the law, their social status compared to men remains quite low. After the 
fall of communism, Russian men wanted to completely reinstate their 
patriarchal position in society and to restore their status as a ‘head’ and 
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‘master’ of the family, positions that they believed had been denied to 
them under communism (Attwood, 1996). This, coupled with a religious 
renaissance in the post communist era and the re-emergence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church as a pivotal institution in Russian society, 
resulted in a renewed emphasis on the domestic role of women as wife 
and mother propagated by the Russian mass media, press, movies, and 
advertisements. Contemporary Russian society sees the chief role of the 
woman as a wife-mother and only secondarily as a worker (Attwood, 
1996).  
To further reinforce traditional family formations, and by 
extension male authority over women in the domestic sphere, the 
government of Russia has instituted massive cuts to several family 
support programs to re-affirm the family as a “private” institution. 
Despite the generous maternity promotion policies to encourage women 
to procreate, the government has largely relinquished its responsibility for 
the material care of women and children, thus reinforcing their economic 
dependency on men (Cubbins & Vannoy, 2005). Child benefits are small 
and are generally insufficient for the support of even one child, much less 
multiple children. Many publicly funded daycare centers and 
kindergartens have been closed or become private. Further, severe 
housing shortages in Russia dictate that many people do not own their 
property and communal living arrangements, by necessity, are common 
(Horne, 1999; Stickley, Tiofeeva, & Sparen, 2008). As “public” support 
for the long-term economic well-being of families diminished in the post-
communist era, the family was recreated as a private institution, a process 
which “undermined the independence of women within the reproductive 
sphere” (Ashwin, 2000, pp. 19-20). This reconstruction of the family as a 
private patriarchal institution as a consequence of both Russian social 
policy and the re-emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church after the 
collapse of the USSR provides a vital backdrop for understanding 
violence against Russian Orthodox women. 
 
IPVAW in Russia 
 
Although it is not possible to determine if there have been shifts in the 
prevalence of IPVAW in Russia since the fall of communism, as data 
suppression under the communist regime prohibited the collection of, and 
disclosure of, such statistics, it is commonly believed that women in 
Russia are at a heightened risk of intimate partner victimization compared 
to women in the West (Gondolf & Shestakov, 1997; Horne, 1999). 
Current statistics suggest that approximately 36,000 Russian women are 
physically victimized at the hands of their intimate partner on a daily 
basis and that 79% of married women in Russia have experienced 
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physical abuse by their partners during their marriage (Fedorova, 2005). 
While these figures are alarmingly high, it is commonly believed that they 
underestimate the true scope of IPVAW in Russia (Fedorova, 2005).   
  The widespread nature of intimate partner violence in Russian is 
intrinsically linked to the macro-level contexts in which such violence 
occurs. “Attempts to return women to a more domestic mode of life, and 
the proliferation of images of violence against women which abound on 
cinema screens and in the press, can be seen as two sides of the same 
coin: this could be termed the aggressive re-masculinization of post-
Soviet Russia” (Attwood, 1996, p. 259). The masculinization of Russian 
society, coupled with the lack of legal infrastructure to adequately handle 
reported cases of IPVAW, have resulted in most instances of intimate 
partner violence remaining unreported to police (Benninger-Budel & 
O'Hanlon, 2004). IPVAW in Russia is illegal under the Russian criminal 
code; however, it is dealt with under “general assault” provisions, as 
opposed to separate legal provisions specifically governing violence 
against women by their intimate partners (Crandall, Senturia, Sullivan, & 
Shiu-Thornton, 2005; Fedorova, 2005). When cases of IPVAW are 
reported to the militia, the issue is often referred back to the family to 
address as a private matter (Horne, 1999; Stickley et al., 2008; Stickly, 
Timofeeva, & Sparen, 2008). Even though women have the right to file 
reports of IPVAW with the militia, the militia has “the right to refuse 
complaints and reject cases for prosecution if they believe they cannot be 
won” (Horne, 1999, p. 58). It has also been documented that, in the rare 
case that militia does accept reports from victims, barriers in the legal 
system commonly prevent successful prosecution (Horne, 1999).  
 The climate of social acceptance in Russia that allows violence 
against women by their intimate partners to remain largely unchallenged 
has been heavily influenced by the traditions and principles of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. The Church’s construction of the family as a 
private patriarchal institution contributes to the prevailing opinion of 
Russians that IPVAW is a private matter and should be solved within the 
family. The re-emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church, and its 
endorsement by the Russian government as important for nationalism, has 
also further solidified cultural endorsement of traditional gender 
ideologies that support male dominance and female submissiveness. 
Indeed, research on attitudes towards gender traditionalism in the United 
States and Russia suggest that Russians are more likely to believe in 
differentiated gender roles rooted in biological essentialism (a central 
tenet of Russian Orthodox teachings) and that Russian men envision little 
likelihood of ever changing such arrangements (Henderson-King & 
Zhermer, 2003). Such attitudes, for some men, serve to normalize 
IPVAW and contribute to the blaming of victims for the violence inflicted 
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upon them (Stickley, Timofeevaa, & Sparen, 2008). Indeed, research on 
attitudes about IPVAW in Russia has suggested that there are several 
situations in which a man is believed to be justified for perpetrating 
violence against his partner (Stickly et al, 2008). The common cultural 
acceptance of IPVAW is further evidenced in several popular Russian 
proverbs such as “Beat the wife for better cabbage soup” (Cubbins & 
Vannoy, 2005), “A beating man is a loving man” (Benninger-Budel & 
O'Hanlon, 2004), and “A woman falls down from a carriage, it becomes 
easier for a horse” (World Sayings, 2009).    
 
Implications for Social Services 
 
A focus on the role of religion and spirituality in the lives of survivors of 
IPVAW is essential for the development of services for battered women 
from a feminist intersectional perspective. Research with women from 
diverse religious and spiritual orientations has suggested, however, that 
traditional approaches to feminist practice tend to treat all women of a 
particular faith or religious tradition as a homogenous group, ignoring 
important within-group variations among women of a shared faith 
(Gentlewarrior, Martin-Jearld, Skok & Sweetster, 2008). Qualitative 
research with Christian women in violent relationships has demonstrated 
that women’s personal sense of Christian identity differentially shaped 
the meanings they ascribed to violence and to their chosen strategies for 
addressing the violence in their lives (Pyles, 2007; Wendt, 2008).  
In developing services for women of Russian Orthodox faith who 
are experiencing intimate partner violence, from a feminist intersectional 
perspective, it is imperative that organizations use an individualized 
approach to assessment and intervention that does not assume that all 
women share a common internalized belief system. Given that the 
overwhelming majority of women in Russia identify as Russian 
Orthodox, the degree to which women adhere to the tenets of orthodoxy 
may vary considerably among women with a formal affiliation with the 
Russian Orthodox Church. For example, research conducted by Rose 
(2002) on the religious commitment of followers of Russian Orthodoxy in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan found significant variation in adherence to 
the precepts of Orthodoxy. In Kazakhstan, 37% of individuals who 
identify as being of Russian Orthodox faith report ignoring religious 
rules, while 56% of followers attempt to follow religious law “some, but 
not all” of the time (Rose, 2002). Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, 24% of 
individuals who identify as Russian Orthodox report being “indifferent” 
to religious precepts, 64% say that they attempt to adhere to religious 
doctrine “some of the time”, and only 12% of followers report following 
religious law all of the time (Rose, 2002). Research on followers of 
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Russian Orthodoxy within Russia has also shown significant differences 
between “devout Orthodox”, those who identify as Russian Orthodox and 
attend church at least once a month, and “cultural Orthodox”, those who 
identify as Russian Orthodox but rarely (if ever) attend church, in basic 
attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church and its relevance to their 
lives (Marsh, 2005). Given the enormous variation within the category of 
those who identify as Russian Orthodox, it cannot be assumed that the 
role of religion will be identical in shaping the experiences and choices of 
all survivors of violence within the Russian Orthodox faith. 
 Battered women’s advocates have highlighted the importance of 
empowering survivors of IPVAW to make their own decisions regarding 
the termination or continuation of violent relationships and have 
cautioned service providers against pressuring women to leave 
relationships as the only viable option for addressing intimate partner 
violence (Peled, 2000). As survivors of violence have been disempowered 
by their abusers, a primary role of service providers is to re-establish a 
woman’s sense of personal autonomy and to facilitate her empowerment 
to make independent decisions and act on her own behalf. This principle 
becomes particularly important when working with women of the Russian 
Orthodox faith. Feminist advocates and service providers must recognize 
the potentially powerful role of religious doctrine in the lives of some 
Russian Orthodox women that dictates that leaving marital relationships, 
even if those relationships are violent, is not a viable option for some 
women. Although the official stance of the Russian Orthodox Church 
allows for the dissolution of marriages on the basis of “encroachment on 
the life or health of a spouse,” of which intimate partner violence would 
be an example, ending a violent marital relationship is not congruent with 
the belief system of some women of Russian Orthodox faith. Further, 
severe housing shortages in Russia dictate that many families must live in 
communal apartment arrangements, making it common for ex-spouses to 
be forced to continue to live together even after the dissolution of a 
relationship (Horne, 1999; Stickley, Tiofeeva, & Sparen, 2008). As lack 
of available and affordable housing creates structural barriers for women 
contemplating exiting violent relationships, many women quite simply 
have nowhere else to go even if they do not hold religious beliefs that 
prohibit the consideration of divorce. Feminist advocates and service 
providers must “start where the client is” and this means acknowledging 
that exiting abusive relationships is not a viable option for all women.    
Working with women of Russian Orthodox faith, it is important 
that service providers decentralize the question of whether or not a 
woman should stay with her abusive partner and prioritize a consideration 
of a woman’s immediate and long-term safety. Battered women’s 
advocates have emphasized the primary importance of exploring safety 
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options with women and creating individualized safety plans that 
recognize women’s unique circumstances, regardless of whether a woman 
is choosing to remain in or terminate a violent relationship (Stout & 
McPhail, 1998). Social service providers can play an important role in 
cross-training clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church about how to 
engage in such conversations with women in their congregation who are 
seeking religious guidance in response to relationship violence, how to 
conduct safety and lethality assessments to assess a women’s current level 
of physical danger, and how to explore with women safety options to 
reduce the risk of physical harm to themselves and their children.  
In addition, advocates and social service providers can play an 
important role in educating both the public and the clergy about the 
dynamics of IPVAW. As there has historically been no common language 
in Russia to describe the experience of intimate partner violence, with 
words like “battering” and “batterer” non-existent in the Russian context, 
it may be difficult for many women to discuss their experiences of 
violence with others due to the lack of a common language (Horne, 
1999). Although feminist activists in Russia have attempted to create 
Russian terminology that is equivalent to that of terms like “domestic 
violence” used in the English context (domashnee nasilie), such language 
did not exist until the late 1990s (Johnson, 2007). By the early 2000s, 
newly developed crisis centers in Russia, in their attempts to create 
language that resonated more with the Russian populace, began framing 
the issue more so as nasilie v sem’e (“violence in the family”) to 
emphasize the need for the protection of women and children within the 
domestic sphere. Such terminology, by framing the problem in terms of 
the need for the protection of women rather than the need for the 
empowerment of women, was intended to bolster public awareness of the 
issues of IPVAW in a way that did not overtly challenge entrenched 
gender traditionalism (Johnson, 2007). As such an approach to violence 
prevention is not inconsistent with Russian Orthodoxy but, rather, is 
consistent with belief systems regarding the role of husband as protector 
of his family, clergy can play a powerful role in the continued 
development of public education campaigns grounded in a gendered 
perspective to further public awareness of the unacceptability of IPVAW.    
As IPVAW has been commonly constructed as a “private 
concern” in Russia, there have historically been few formal services to 
assist women in violent relationships. Indeed, the first crisis center 
specifically designed to assist victims of intimate partner violence did not 
appear in Moscow until 1992, suggesting that public acknowledgement of 
IPVAW as a social concern has been late in the making (Horne, 1999). 
Further, as previously noted, there is little infrastructure in place for 
enforcing the laws, with the police and criminal justice system commonly 
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treating intimate partner violence as a private matter to be resolved 
without the intrusion of the state (Crandall, Senturia, Sullivan, & Shiu-
Thornton, 2005; Horne, 1999; Stickley et. al, 2008; Stickley, Timofeeva, 
& Sparen, 2008). Given that public discourses regarding issues of 
intimate partner violence have only recently emerged, it is still unknown 
what behaviors are commonly considered “violent” in the Russian context 
(Horne, 1999). By providing accurate information about the dynamics of 
violence in intimate relationships, advocates can help improve the ability 
of women to accurately identify violence in their lives and to take 
effective steps to promote their safety. 
 Given the historical lack of a common language to describe 
IPVAW, the shortage to non-existence of formal services for survivors of 
intimate partner violence, and the lack of formal state intervention in 
protecting women in violent relationships, it is unlikely that large 
numbers of women, particularly Russian Orthodox women, will seek help 
from formal institutions when confronted with violence. As such, 
improving the ability of the Russian Orthodox Church to accurately 
assess and intervene in circumstances of intimate partner violence is 
particularly critical. Given that the majority of men and women in Russia 
report a formal affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church, the clergy 
is well positioned to be trained as “first responders” to assist women in 
violent relationships. 
 Clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church can play a powerful role 
in using gendered perspectives to challenge the abuse and misuse of 
religious doctrine to justify IPVAW. The official position of the Russian 
Orthodox Church is that men are prohibited from engaging in behaviors 
that “encroach on the life or health of the spouse” (Russian Orthodox 
Church, 2000, X: 3, ¶5). This must be interpreted by clergy as a 
proscription against the use of violence against women to maintain male 
authority. Clergy can educate both men and women that IPVAW is not 
sanctioned in the Russian Orthodox Church through illumination of key 
passages of scripture that highlight the unacceptable nature of violence in 
the home. Indeed, the protection of women within the domestic sphere 
does not challenge the gender traditionalism that lies at the core of 
Russian Orthodox faith but, rather, can be construed as an obligation of 
men under Russian Orthodoxy (Johnson, 2007). As such, clergy can 
frame violence prevention as consistent with the basic tenets of 
Orthodoxy as opposed to being in conflict with such tenets. Further, for 
women of faith who do elect to exit violent relationships, the clergy can 
provide non-judgmental spiritual support and guidance. An exploration of 
God’s forgiveness can be powerful in assisting women who do break the 
covenant of marriage but perceive their actions to be inconsistent with 
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religious doctrine to know that their actions will be forgiven by their 
higher power.   
Given the prominence of the Russian Orthodox Church within 
Russia, clergy can be very powerful in lobbying the government to 
seriously address IPVAW as a public issue. Silence has historically 
surrounded the topic of intimate partner violence in Russia, isolating 
individual victims and constructing intimate partner violence as a “private 
trouble”. As the dominant religious institution in Russia, the Russian 
Orthodox Church can play a powerful role in lifting the veil of silence 
that surrounds intimate partner violence. Clergy within the church must 
work in conjunction with the government to raise public awareness of 
issues of IPVAW and to work toward coordinated community responses 
that promote a zero tolerance approach to male violence against women. 
As there is currently no national legislation in Russia that criminalizes 
intimate partner violence as a distinct criminal offence (Johnson, 2007), 
clergy can use their privileged position in relation to the state to put such 
legislation on the national agenda. 
 Finally, it has been argued that common multicultural approaches 
to cultural competency within social work have been grounded in a 
“celebration of differences” approach to understanding human diversity 
that provides little analysis of power and the ways in which different 
belief systems have been used to promote oppression (Gentlewarrior et 
al., 2008). Such an approach has resulted in some practitioners refusing to 
analyze the abuse and misuse of power in diverse religious orientations 
due to a fear that such an analysis is not consistent with culturally 
sensitive practice. Issues of violence, however, represent clear abuses of 
power that threaten the health, well-being, and basic human rights of 
women. As such, to ignore engaging in a critical discussion of the ways in 
which certain aspects of religious doctrine have been misused by some 
men in the Russian Orthodox Church as a justification for IPVAW is not 
only inconsistent with social work’s social justice mandate but also 
threatens the safety and physical integrity of women within the Russian 
Orthodox faith. To approach religious issues with a relativist approach 
that celebrates all interpretations of religious doctrines as equally valid, 
and therefore unquestionable, is to ignore the ways in which religious 
doctrines have been misappropriated and misinterpreted as a 
rationalization for gender-based violence. Social workers must begin to 
have these difficult dialogues if we are to incorporate a truly culturally 
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